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Introduction 
According to International law， ships engaged in commercial tr羽田
ing must be registered in a State whose flag they are allowed to fly. 
As a process which ties a seagoing vessel to a sovereign State， regis-
tration involves both rights and duties. By extending its nationality 
to a ship， the Flag State protects it against possible intrusion by 
foreign powers' within the bounds of international law. However， 
the sovereign right to grant a flag' also called registration comes 
with its fair share of burden; the Flag State is indeed required by 
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. JSPS Postdoctoral Fellow， University of Tsukuba， Institute of Social Sciences. This 
study has been carried out during a research tenure generously funded by the Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science. The author is highly indebted to Professor Osamu 
Yoshida， Professor of Intemational Law at the University of Tsukuba， Institute of So-
cial Sciences for kindJy reviewing this paper‘ 
1 Ships without a f1ag (or nationalityl enjoy no protection under int泡rnationallaw.Such 
ships are liable to be boarded even in the high seas by any State and for any reason as 
Jong as it matters to that State. Under US law for instance，“a vesseJ subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States include沼 avessel without nationality" 46 USC APP. 1903 
(c)(l)(A). The US Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this principle in 
United Stαtes v. Marino.Gαrcia a case involving two stateless vessels seized by the 
Coast Guard while carrying marijuana in the high seas near Cuba. The Court stated 
that "vesse!s without nationality are international pariahs. They have no intemation-
ally recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas." Mαrino-Gαrciα， 679 F.2d at 
1382. The seminal case in English law is Naim-Molvαn v the At的rnの-Generalfor Pales-
tine in which the Privy Council ruled that the seizure of a vessel carrying J ewish set司
tlers in the high seas while flying no flag was legal and the forfeiture proper. [1948] AC 
351 
2 This right was first recognized by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1905 in the 
Muscαt Dhows Case (France v. Great Britain). In this case， the Court held that ".・ gen-
erally speaking it belongs to every sovereign to decide to whom he will accord the right 
to fly his f1ag and to prescribe the rules governing such grants". 11 RlAA (1905) pp.83. 
This principJe was reaffirmed by the US Supreme Court in Lαuritzen v. Lαrsen， 345 US 
571; 1953 AlkfC 1210 (1953) 
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international law to exercise jurisdiction and control in administra-
tive， technical as well as social matters over ships f1ying i旬f1aピ.In 
other words， the ascription of a f1ag carries with it a corresponding 
obligation to police its use. This obligation applies旬 variousas-
pects of safety at sea， construction， maintenance， manning， labor 
conditions on board and most importantly; the Flag State must en-
sure that ships under its registry are appropriately surveyed before 
being issued the necessary certificates of seaworthiness which al10w 
them to trade internationally. These are basic requirements of in蝿
ternational law as specified by an array of multinational conven-
tions from SOLAS to MARPOL and are widely believed to be part 
and parcel of customary international law! Furthermore the 1982 
UNCLOS requires States to establish rules and standards to pre-
vent reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from 
vessels at the globallevel and implement or enforce them at the na-
tional leve15• UNCLOS also lays down a qualitative requirement un-
der which Flag States' national laws and regulations must at least 
have the same effect as that of generally accepted rules and stan-
dards6• 
Traditional1y， the major maritime powers possess the necessary 
infrastructure to meet these various obligations and a competent 
administration7 responsible for ensuring and monitoring compliance 
by their merchant f1eet with international safety regulations. How幽
ever， a troubling reality of today's shipping world is the presence 
along side nations with strong maritime credentials of Flag States 
lacking both the wi1l and means to carry out the basic responsibili幽
ties associated with operating a ship registry. Technical tasks asso・
ciated with ship safety are often outsourced by these States to pri-
， UNCLOS， article 94. Text reprinted in 21 I.L.M. (1982)， atp. 1261 
4 Birnie and Boyle， Internαtionα1 Lα即 &the Environment， Oxford (202)， 2nd Ed町 at
pp.361 and 370 
" UNCLOS， articles 211 and 217 
6 UNCLOS， article 211 (2) 
7 UNCCORS， article 4 (2)凶Textreprinted in 6ILM 1967 at p. 1229 
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vate companies known as Classification Societies who perform the 
necessary su円 eysand issue certificates on behalf of the Flag State. 
These are known as Open Registries a concept that applies to 
States which authorize beneficial ownership of ships under their 
flag by foreign nationals. The most notorious among them are Flags 
of Convenience (FOCs); so named because the sovereign power 
granting the flag has no genuine link8 with the ownership or man-
agement of the vessel and does so for the sole purpose of extracting 
t蹴 revenueswhile the shipowner's choice of registry is essentially 
driven by expectations of a loose legal environment that would 
尽laranteehim operational flexibility， low cost labor and substantial 
profits. 
In the universe of maritime transport where fierce competition 
has always been a constant， the practice of “flagging out" to a con-
venient registry has become widespread and for some unscrupulous 
shipowners; the ideal safety device in their relentless quest for re-
maining afloat. The ineluctable consequence of this cost cutting h抑制
teria is that today， more than half of the world's fleet is under flag 
of convenience9 and environmentally sensitive substances such a自
???
? ?
8 The 1'equirement fo1' a genuine link between the vesseJ and the flag has been set fo1'th 
in A1'ticJe 5 ofthe 1958 High Seas Convention; text avaiJabJe in 450 UNTS， No. 6465， 
at p. 82 -103. In p1'actice， itdid not p1'event the flou1'ishing of FOCs and the deveJop-
ment of second 1'egistries known asもis1'egist1'iesぺapolicy inaugu1'ated by Norway in 
1987， soon followed by F1'ance， B1'itain and the Netherlands. The “bis 1'egistries" were 
meant to counter the phenomenon of FOCs by c1'eating mo1'e competitive 10caJ flets 
with the possibiJity of hiring fo1'eign町ew印刷ectto mo1'e t1exibJe labo1' laws. Ships 
Jisted under this second regist1'Y incu1' a Jower ope1'ationaJ cost and the1'efo1'e are mo1'e 
competitive than those on the prima1'Y 1'egistry. Basically this device was invented by 
weste1'n powers in o1'der ωmaintain a substantial maritime standing by undercutting 
the pressure within their domestic shipping communities to flag out to open 1'egistries. 
9 In 1950 FOCs rep1'esented only 9% of the wo1'ld flet; in 2000 this sha1'e hit a record 
509ιOnJy six count1'ies CPanama， Liberia， G1'eece， Bahamas， Cyprus， and Malta) control 
nominally 53% of the world tonnage. However， their 1'eal share is insignificant since al 
six countries togethe1' rep1'esent lesB than 0‘2% of the world flet. Hence. the over 
whelming majority of ships registe1'ed in these States are owned and controlled by fo1'田
町駅1nationals， mostly仕omOECD countries. For instance the enti1'e f1eet of Hong Kong 
as weJJ as 1/5 of Japan's f1et is unde1' Panamean f1ag. SimilarJy， almost the enti1'e Li向
be1'ian f1et is US owned. See I.D.♂avillons de complaisance en chi質量es.)}in l'Human-
ite， Issue of Decembe1' 30th， 1999. 
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oil are essentially transported by ships f1ying such f1ags!O. Most of 
these States do not have the resources to properly regulate their 
huge f1eets. Furthermore， because of their dependence upon registry 
income， they do not have the inclination to rigorously prevent and 
punish pollution from their multinational clients. The result is that 
an important f1eet of vessels is operating in the world's oceans with-
out complying with formally agreed international norms; a phe圃
nomenon that came to be known as substandard shipping. With en-
vironmental issues coming to mounting prominence in the 1970 ties， 
the international community has come under tremendous pressure 
to act. Solutions to this problem have been sought mainly in two di-
rections. First， by calling on Flag States to show more resilience in 
enforcing international safety related laws and regulationsl1. Second 
by gradually developing a parallel system of enforcement of interna-
tional rules and自tandardsunder which Port Stat疋sare granted 
greater powers12• The rationale behind this reallocation of jurisdic-
tion is the fact that exclusive reliance on flag enforcement has 
failed to prevent and effectively tackle the problem of substandard 
1(1 The ma1'ket is o1'ganized in such a way that the most polluting substances also caJled 
“black p1'oducts" a1'e t1'anspo1'ted by the oldest vessels that a1'e approaching the end of 
their service 01' even su1'passed it. 
II The impo1'tance of Flag State implementation and enforcement has been highlighted 
in IMO Guidelines of 1997 which set out means fo1' Flag States to maintain measu1'es 
fo1' the effective application and enfo1'cement of relevant conventions. See IMO Assem-
bly Resolu針。nA.740 (18) (1993) and A.847 (20) (1997). The Assembly also established 
in 1992 a Flag State Implementation Committee 1'esponsible fo1' the identification of 
measu1'es necessa1'yωensu1'e effective and consistent global implementation of IMO in-
struments by Flag States and adopted a Code fo1' the Investigation of Ma1'ine Casualties 
and Incidents， which 1'equests Flag States to conduct an investigation of al s四'Ious
casualties; Resolution A. 849 (20) (1997). These measu1'es came afie1' the international 
community's efforts to impose a“genuine link" 1'equirement between flag and ships have 
failed mainly because of the opposition of a coalition of FOCs and powe1'ful transna-
tional lobbies who benefited fI"om the status quo. 
12 Under MARPOL， these powers include the right of the Po1't State to inspect a fo1'eign 
vessel and to detain it when the condition of the vessel 80 warrants， until it can proceed 
to sea without posing an un1'easonable th1'eat of harm to the marine envi1'onment. Not 
only has UNCLOS consolidated the detention powe1's of the Port State， italso entitles it 
to unde1'take legal p1'oceedings against a vessel in one of its ports fo1' alleged discharges 
of polluting substances outside that State's te1'1'itorial sea 01' EEZ in violation of applica-
ble inte1'national rules and standards established th1'ough the competent international 
organization or general diplomatic conference. (Article 218). Detention and a1'1'est a1'e 
however subject to conditions specified in Articles 223 and 232 of UNCLOS. 
???
? ?
???????????
?
? ?
The Tsukuba University Journal of Law and Political Science No.39.2005 
shipping. Despite the powers at their disposal， Flag States are often 
lax on enforcement. While Coastal States who are at the receiving 
end of maritime tragedies and for this reason may be more inclined 
to act， they lack the appropriate legal entitlement to do so. In other 
words， those with the power to act fail to act because they have no 
incentive to act and those with the incentives have no power to act. 
Port State Control is expected to correct this imbalance by ensuring 
that the power to enforce laws is extended to those who are most 
likely to take action'3• Early advocates of Port State Control believe 
that this reallocation of enforcement powers would help the interna-
tional community tackle decisively the problem of substandard ship-
ping.'4 The purpose of this paper is to revisit this assumption in the 
light of the Erikαoil spill in December 1999 in France. The Erikα 
was ltalian owned， Maltese flagged 24 years old tanker which had 
been previously inspected by Port States， Flag States and industry 
inspectors on several occasions. The Erikαalso possessed valid ce子
tificates issued by the Registro ltaliano Navale (RINA) a full mem. 
International Association of Classification Societies 
(lACS). And yet this tanker which presented al the formal warran-
ties of seaworthiness broke in two as a consequence of a structural 
failure. It is suggested that this incident highlights the fact that 
Port State control is not immune to the kind of shortfalls that have 
of the ber 
undermined faith in Flag State enforcement of international law on 
ship safety and pollution prevention. The paper investigates the 
problems that beset the adequate implementation of PSC and ex. 
plains why it may not be the ultimate fix to the problem of substan-
dard shipping. 
The paper contains three sections， section one discusses the ration-
ale for PSC and comments its legal basis in international law. Sec-
???
? ?
13 See Apolis， L'empr悶emαritimede 1 'Et，αt cotier， Pedone (1981) at p. 228 
14 See Hare 
Jou必rnα1of Internαti回onαlαndCo町mpαrti日veLαz却IJNo. 3， (197) at p.68; in the same vein 
se remarks by the French and Finish Delegates at the 62"，1 International Labor Confer-
ence (!LC) of 1976， Record of Proceedings， p 186 and 18 
Port State Control as a Dete町'entto Substandard Shipping: 
Promise versus Performance 
tion two looks at institutional instruments adopted by States for出e
implementation of PSC， focusing particularly on the Paris Memo-
randum of Understanding on Port State Control (hereinafter Paris 
MOU). The third section brings the Erikαincident in perspective 
and presents it as an illustration of gaps' and shortfalls. The paper 
concludes by stressing the need for the international community旬
shift仕omcurrent paradigms exclusively inspired by the command 
and control type of legislation to more pragmatic solutions rooted in 
an understanding of the economic rationale that drive substandard 
shipping. 
1. Political Rationale and Legal Underpinnings of Port State 
Control 
The right of a State to exercise jurisdiction on foreign vessels in its 
internal waters， more so in its ports is long established in custom-
ary law15• However， the articulation of the notion as well as its ex-
tensive construction in contemporary international law is closely 
bound up with the need to protect the marine environment against 
pollution企omships. Port State Control is an immediate by-product 
of the dysfunctional implementation by some flag States of their ob・
ligations regarding the marine environment. With the succession 
maritime disasters often involving oil tankers， Coastal States came 
under intense pressure mostly金閣nan internal coalition of environ-
15 See Churchill & Lowe， The LαW ofthe Se，α， Manchester University pr回s，at p. 54-
57; also Somers句‘heRole of the Courts in Enforcement of Environmental Rules"泊
Freestone & IJIstra Eds. The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional Environment，αlG∞'p-
eration， Special Isue of the lnternαtional Journal of Estuarineαnd Co田tα1Lαw 
仔'JECL)Graham &τ'rotman， (1990) at p. 193. Historicaly“le notion that a State has 
jurisdiction over commercial vesels within its po此shas never been challenged in inter-
nationallaw. However， States have generally refrained台。mexercising jurisdiction over 
foreign ship on matters relating to the intemal economy of母国ぬ.ip.Most opinions con-
cur句ぬefact that such atitudes are based on comity rather than mandated by inter司
nationallaw. 
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mental groups and coastal economic interests to extend of their pol-
lution control jurisdiction beyond the three開mileterritorial sea'6• Al-
though these claims cannot be dissociated with general trend by 
coastal powers to increase and expand their grip over maritime 
spaces adjacent to their territory17， they have been essentially ar-
ticulated on two grounds; 
The right to self-protection for its own citizens and the en-
vironment against the dangers presented by substandard 
ships; and 
International 
• 
dealing 
safety at sea， by preventing unseaworthy日hipsfrom pro-
ceeding to sea. 
However， maritime States opposed what they considered to be an 
unprecedented assertion of jurisdiction with a potential to interfere 
with their traditional freedom of navigation'8. They feared that un-
scrupulous States might use environmental enforcement as a device 
to hassle and prosecute their ships for political reasonsベThe
United States was one of those concerned in particular， the Depart“ 
ment of Defense.剖 However，while they defended their rights as 
maritime nations， these States were also Coastal States and for this 
reason were qui旬 receptiveto calls for a much vigorous exercise of 
jurisdiction by States over foreign vessels entering their ports. Un-
der such conditions， the concept of Port State Control easily gained 
acceptance from both sides and became the compromise which 
with of conventions enforcement • 
? ? ? ?
? ?
凶 SeeDoc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.6. Dra自tarticles on a zonal approach to the prevention of 
polution of the marine environment submitted by Canada， F討i，Ghana， Guyana， Ice-
land， Iran， New Zealand， Philippines， Spain. II UNCLOS Oficial Records， Vol. II at 
249. 
17 Apolis， note 13 at p. 222. 
l.' See for instance the p田itionexpressed by Germany on the draft articles on enforce-
ment of regulations concerning the protection of the marine environment against vesel-
source polution. AlCONF.62/C.31L.7. II UNCLOS Of. Rec.， Vol. II at 250; se also the 
statement ofthe delegate ofLiberia， II UNCLOS OF. REC.， Vol. I at 315 
19 M'Gonigle & Zacher， Pollution， Politicsαnd InternαtionαlLα即・ TαnkersαtSeα:， Uni-
versity of California Pres (1979) at p. 208-209‘ 
加Idat 209-210 
四8 
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closed the gap between the two extremes.21 Simply defined， PSC 
means that: 
“a State may exercise jurisdiction over foreign ships in its po此sin 
respect of offenses against international rules and standards even if 
committed in sea areas beyond its coastal jurisdiction"'even if the 
violations were committed on the high seas (or foreign waters) and 
they did not in any way affect the Port State， the later would be en幽
titled to take enforcement action against the vessel concerned"22 
Under the MARPOL Convention2a， the Port State has the power not 
only arrest (arrest jurisdiction) but also to try (judicial jurisdiction) 
a foreign vessel found in breach of its anti pollution legislation 
either in one of its ports or territorial sea. This jurisdiction does not 
apply to acts committed outside the territorial sea. However， MAR-
POL authorizes Port States to inspect foreign vessels and detain 
them when their condition so warrants until they can proceed to sea 
without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine 
environment. 
It is however with the Third United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS?4 that the rise of the Port State has received 
its most obvious consecration. 
Not only does UNCLOS confirm the powers of the Port State al-
ready embodied in previous instruments such as MARPOL i.e.， the 
power to arrest in one of its ports and prosecute a foreign vessel for 
violation of its pollution laws or applicable international rules in its 
territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)"5 it goes a step 
urther by acknowledging the right of a Port State to prosecute a 
21 In adition to being acceptable to both Coastal and Flag States， PSC also has the 
merit that it can be appliedωthe vesels of non parties to MARPOL or SOLAS as a 
condition of port entry. 
出 Hakapa且，MαrinePollution in InternαtionαlLαω， Helsinki (1981) at p. 172 
山 Textreprinted in 17 ILM (1978) at 546. 
，. Text reprinted in 21 ILM (1982)， atp. 1261. 
25 Article 221 ofUNCLOS 
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foreign vessel that is alleged to have caused pollution outside its 
territorial sea or EEZ in violation of applicable international rules 
and standards established through the competent international or-
ganization or general diplomatic conference26• UNCLOS also reiter-
ates the powers of the Port State to take administrative measures 
to prevent a vessel in its port from sailing should it be in breach of 
applicable international rules and standards relating to seaworthi-
ness and. thereby threatens damage to the marine environment un-
til the causes of the violation is removed unless the vessel is going 
旬 thenearest repair yard. Besides MARPOL， these rules and stan-
dards 町 eembodied in several other international conventions 
adopted under the aegis of IMO and ILO such as: 
・明le1966 Load Lines Convention町
The 1974178 SOLAS却
STCW9 
• 
• 
ILO Convention No. 147 on Minimum Standards30 (safety 
and working conditions) 
Control under these conventions essentially consists in位leverifica-
tion of the existence of cer揃 catesand their validity. Physical in-
spection is undertaken only when the Port State Control Officer 
(PSCO) considers that there are “Clear grounds" to believe that the 
ship's equipments訂 einadequate31 or do not substantially coπ'e-
spond with the particulars of the certificates (SOLAS) or that the 
working conditions on board are below appropriate standards32• Re-
• 
??
??
26 ArticJe 218 of UNCLOS 
27 Article 21， text of出e1966 Load Lines Convention reprinted in 640 UNTS (1967) at p. 
13. 
舗Regulation19 of Chapter 1; Regulation 2 ofChapter 8; text reprinted in 17 ILM 
(1978) at p. 579. 
29 Article 10 (1)，ぬxtreprinted in UKTS (1984) at p. 50. 
剖Article4， ILO Convention No. 147 on Minimum Standards， text reprinted in 15ILM 
(1976) at p. 1288 
31 Article 6 ofMARPOL. Since 1996， a new MARPOL re伊lationalso allowed Port State 
inspection where there are clear grounds for believing that that the master or CI唱W 副唱
not f1町niliarwith esential shipboard procedures relating to世田preventionof polution 
by oil. Re酔lation8A， Annexes 1， 1， 11and V. See Valenzuela， inVidas and 0streng 
eds. Order for the 0目αmαtthe Turn of the Centuηat p.500 
32 ILO Convention No. 147 on Minimum S切ndards，note 30. 
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gional PSC arrangements such as the Paris MOU try to dilute the 
discretionary power of PSCOs by laying down certain criteria the 
presence of which would indicate a compelling case for physical in帽
spection.却Whenirregularities are found， the PSCO is entitled to 
take steps to ensure that the vessel does not sail until it can do so 
without causing risks to the marine environment. If action of this 
type is taken， the Flag State must be informed through its nearest 
maritime consular or diplomatic representative of the action taken 
and the circumstances and if possible have such a representative 
present. Such facts also must be reported to IMO. In order not to 
encourage abuses in the exercise of such power， most conventions 
contain a caveat to ensure that inspections should not unduly delay 
the ship34. Furthermore， vessels chosen for inspection should not be 
selected in a discriminatory manner and standards should be evenly 
applied. To summarize the point， itmay be said that in substance， 
PSC is conducted to ensure that foreign ships are seaworthy; that 
they do not pose a pollution risk; provide a healthy and safe work-
ing environment; and comply with the relevant International Con-
ventions. We shall now turn in to examining how it works in prac-
tice. 
?????
" Article 3 of the Paris MOU states that “a report of notification by another Authority; 
a report or complaint by the master， a crew member， ora person or organization with a 
legitimate interest in the safe operation of the ship， shipboard living conditions or the 
prevention of pollution， unless the Authority concerned deems the report or complaint to 
be manifestly unfounded; other indications of serious deficiencies， having regard in par-
ticular to Annex l." The Directive 2001l106/EC modifying the Directive 95/21氾Cgoes 
even further by imposing mandatory inspections on certain ships. See text at OJ L 19/ 
17， 22. 1. 2002. 
:14 See Article 219 of UNCLOS ?“Measures relating to seaworthiness of vesseIs ωavoid 
poIlution勺foran insightful discussion of the potential conflict illvolved between safety 
and the fluidity of commercial transactions， see BoissOll， 8α:fetyαt Se仕 Policies，Regulα目
Uonsαnd InternαtionαILα山， Editions Bureau Veritas， (1999) at p. 452 
???????????
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2. The Institutional Framework for the implementation of 
PSC: the Paris MOU and its Regional Replicas 
Ideal1y， the implementation by Port State of international rules per-
taining to日hipsafety and pollution prevention would be carried out 
under the supervision of an independent international body and the 
IMO would appear to offer the best warranty of impartiality for 
such a role. At present however， IMO does not perform a supervi-
sory function on a worldwide basis neither does it have the constitu-
tional powers to enforce or oversee the enforcement of international 
commitments negotiated under its leadership. This limitation has 
meant that from a theoretical point of view， eveIγStates wi1l deter-
mine on its own what enforcement measures will be necessary in 
order to come in line with its international commitments. In prac-
tice however， policy coordination rather than unilateral action has 
prevailed in the enforcement of Port State Control. Such coordi-
nated efforts have been channeled through regional agreements 
known as Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) on PSC. The first 
initiative in this area is the 1982 Paris MOUSS， an administrative 
agreement bringing together mostly Western European countries. 
The successes encountered by the Paris MOU has been acknowl-
edged by the IMO in its Resolution 689 of 1991 in which it calls for 
the development of similar frameworks in other regions of the world. 
Since then， 8 more MOU on PSC closely modeled on the Paris rか
gime have been adopted: 
The Tokyo MOU 
The Acuerdo de Vina del Mar for Latin America 
• 
• 
The Caribbean MOU 
The Abuia MOU for West and Central Africa 
The Mediterranean MOU 
• 
• 
?????• 
The Indian Ocean MOU • 
お Setext ofthe Paris Memorandum ofUnderstanding at 21 ILM at p. 1982. 
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・ The Black 8ea MOU 
・ The Riyadh MOU 
The regional approach 0釘ersmany advantages. Among them the 
gathering and sharing of information about substandard ships 
among participating maritime authorities， the development of uni-
form standards and procedures for control and inspections and most 
important of al it reduces costs by avoiding useless duplication of 
efforts and unjustifiable delays to shipping. 80 far， al the existing 
MOU自 containa clause that exempts from inspection ships that 
have recently undergone inspection by the maritime authorities of a 
8tate party to the same MOU36• Moreover， when coupled with effec-
tive monitoring， uniformity of standards can prevent distortions 
which could res叫tin the establishment of “ports of convenience". 
It is important to stress that these MOUs as such are not a primary 
source of international obligations. Their main pu叩oseis to lay 
down the groundwork for effective cooperation of participating mari-
time authorities in the area of P8C. They a問 essentiallycoopera-
tive a町田1gementsfor the enforcement of existing international 
standards; they do not create new rights and obligations for their 
members but represent a unification of national means of imple.司
menting existing international commitments and responsibilities37• 
Moreover， except the Paris MOU which has been made binding by a 
Council Directive of 199538， the MOU are in principle voluntary， 
therefore， failure by a 8tate to comply with their term does not lead 
to legally enforceable claims. Having briefly exposed the basic ele-
ments common to al MOUs， we shall now move on to a more de-
???
36 This開 q凶rementis made necessarγby the need to se四rethe support of the industry， 
which had already voiced回ncernsover the prospect of facing controls or inspections 
anytime they visit a different po比
37 Kasoulides "Paris Memorandum of Understanding: A Regional Regime of Enforce・
ment" in F四estoneand IJIstra eds. The North Seα: Perspectives on Regional Environ-
ment，α1 Cooperation， Special Issue of IJECL， Graham & Trotman， (1990) at p. 186. 
38 See O.J. L157， 7.7. 1995 at p. 1. Council Directive 9512IAC of 19 June 1995 Concern. 
ing the Enforcement， inr田pectof Ships using Communi句rPorts and Sailing in仕leWa-
ters Under the Ju巾 dictionof the Member States， ofInternational Standards for Ship 
Safety， Pollution Prevention and Shipboard Living and Working Conditions. 
? ?
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tailed analysi日 ofthe Paris MOU which has become出eblueprint 
for the introduction of Port State Control regimes in other regions 
of the world. 
3. The Paris MOU 
The Paris MOU which came into e能ctin July 1982 represents 
Europe's response tοthe 1978 Amoco Cadiz oil spill in France. By 
then， Europe has realized that the adoption of sophisticated treaty 
systems such as MARPOL would make little difference in practice if 
adequate action is not taken to ensure compliance. The MOU was 
therefore aimed at closing the enforcement gap by developing uni-
form rules and procedures， uniform targets and putting in place 
permanent institution呂田叩da computerized network for sharing in-
formation among members. In 1995， the MOU has been made man-
datory by the Council Directive 95/211EC.40 This change of legal 
status合明na soft instrument to hard law meant that non compli-
ance could lead to legal action before European judicial organs. 
Initially the Paris MOU had 17 participating maritime authorities， 
al of them westem Europeans. It has later expanded geographi-
cally to include Canada and most recently the Russian Federation. 
The Paris MOU also maintains a network of cooperative relation-
ships with other regional Port State Control regimes41• The goal of 
?????
掬Thes仕uctureof the Paris MOU consists of the Port State Control Conunittee which is 
the executive body composed of one representative from each participat加gmaritime 
authority and a representative of the EC， the Administration which houses se位・etariat
facilities and is based in the Netherlands， and the Computer Center based in Saint 
Malo， France where al inspection related dat直 ares旬開d即 da切回sibleonline by the 
Par“es to the MOU. 
'0 Directive 95/211EC Concerning the enforcement in respect of shipping using Commu-
nity po此sand sailing waters under the jurisdiction of Member States， ofintemational 
standards for ship safety， pollution prevent and shipboard living and working conditions 
(known as the Port State Control Di四ctive). O.J. L 157，7.7. 1995， atp.1 
41 Two Regional MOU have obtained 0筒cialobserver status to the Paris MOU; the To-
kyoMOU andぬ.eCaribbean MOU. The US Coast Guard is al目oobserver at meetings of 
the Paris MOU. Two others， the Mediterranean and Black Sea MOU have pending ap-
plications. 
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such cooperative arrangements is to ensure as much as possible 
uniformity in control and inspection procedures as well as exchange 
of information and expertise among the various MOU. 
As far as inspection procedures are concerned， Section 3 of the 
MOU provides that; 
In selecting ships for inspection， the Authorities will pay special at-
tention to: 
(a) ships which may present a special hazard， for instance oil-
tankers and gas and chemical caηiers. 
(b) Ships which have several recent deficiencies. 
With the adoption of a new Directive42 following the Erikαspill， the 
so-called Erikα1 Package， additional items have been added in or-
der to make controls more systematic and dilute the discretion of 
PSCO. However the ground breaking element in the new Directive 
is that for the畳間ttime， itdenied port access to certain ships which 
on account of their f1ag， cargo， condition and history pose a serious 
safety hazard. Under Article 7b， gas and chemical tankers， bulk car-
riers， oiltankers， passenger ships shall be refused access if the ship 
either: 
・ f1ies the flag of a State appearing in the black list as pub-
lished in the annual report of the MOU and 
• has been detained more than twice in the course of the pre-
ceding 24 months in a port of a State signatory of the MOU， 
or 
・ f1ies the flag of a State described as“very high risk" or 
“high risk" in the black list as published in the annual re-
port of the MOU and 
• has been detained more than twice in the course of the pre帽
ceding 36 months in a port of a State signatOlγofthe MOU 
四 Inaddition to this， any ship not subject to an expanded inspection 
五
? ? 42 Directive 2001/106IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 
2001; O.J. L 19/17， 22.1.2002 
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with a target factor greater than 50 in the SIRENAC information 
system must be inspected “provided that a period of at least one 
month has elapsed since the last inspection carried out in a port in 
the MOU region"43 
However， asthe MOU also自eeksto reconcile maritime safety with 
the fluidity of navigation a notable feature of the Paris MOU， which 
it shares with other MOU， isthat the Authorities will seek to avoid 
inspecting ship日whichhave been inspected by any of the other 
Authorities within the previous six months unless they have clear 
grounds for inspections.4τ'he surveyors are provided with a manual 
containing inter αliαs， references to applicable international conven-
tions and article自ofthe MOU and codes for the information system. 
Upon completing the inspection， the inspector issues to the vessel a 
document containing the results and details of any action taken. 
首lesefindings町 euploaded in the ∞mputer system so that other 
surveyors are able to consult it before going on board a ship. 
An important requirement of the Paris MOU is the obligation im-
posed on each maritime authority to publish quarterly information 
about detentions under PSC procedures.45 This information must 
contain the name of the ship as well as details of the owner， opera‘ 
tor， the flag and the classification society. This measure inspired by 
the “name and shame" approach seeks to bring about a change of 
attitude within the shipping industry where a long tradition of se刷
crecy has too often resulted in problems being hidden or ignored 
rather than revealed and solved. Initially however，日omePort 
States were reluctant to publish detention information for fear of 
exposing themselves to damage suits by ship-owners46.At present， 
??????
必Article4. 2(a) 
“Article 4. 3 ofthe new Directive add the foIowing: the ship is not listed in Annex 1， 
no de宣ciencyhave been reported， folowing a previous inspection， the ship is not cov-
ered by paragraph 2 (a)
" Section 3.14 of the PぽisMOU
46 Kasoulides Port 8t，αte Control αnd Jurisdiction-Evolution ofthe Port 8tate Control Re. 
gime， Martinus Jijhof (193)， atp. 160. at p. 160 
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the situation has changed; publication seems to have gained world欄
wide acceptance and is a practice commonly shared by al1 other 
MOU onPSC. 
The Paris MOU also imposes quantitative control and inspection 
targets to its members. According to Section 1 (3)，“each Authority 
wi1l achieve an annual total of inspections corresponding to 259もof
the estimated number of foreign merchant ships" which entered its 
ports47 • The level of compliance with this target has not always been 
the same for all countr旬s;while States like Greece achieve more 
than 40% i.e.， more than what is required; others like France have 
persistently failed to make it. In 2001， France's performance has 
deteriorated to a mere 9%. This situation prompted a legal action 
by the European Commission asking the European Court of Jus舗
tice48 to declare that in not observing its annual threshold of 25% of 
ships inspected by the Port State as provided for in the 95/21 EC 
Directive， France has infringed European maritime safety rules.49 
Nonetheless， the Paris MOU is seen as a reference and is arguably 
the most advanced regional Port State regime in the world. It is 
this system that has seen its foundations seriously shaken by the 
Erikαincident. 
47 This figure is 75% for the Tokyo MOU， 10係 forthe Indian Ocean MOU while the 
Vina Del Mar， Caribbean， Mediterranean， Black Sea and Abuja MOU mention a mini幽
mum of 15% annual inspections. It is however only under the Paris MOU that failure旬
reach these inspection targets is actionable before court. 1n .June 2002， the European 
Commission decided to sue France and 1reland before the European Court of Justice for 
their failure to meet the 25% tar官et.
'" See CJCE， 22 juin 2004， Commission des Communautes eUl1ο'peenn必sc/ R百'publique
jトancα同町 af.C-439/02， Revue europeenne de droit de l'environnement， (2004)， No 3 at
page 49. 
" The insufljcient number of PSCO in France， which is the consequence of the drastic 
con七ractionof the French merchant f1et under national f1ag is given as a major ex-
planatory factor of the country' s failure to meet its mandatory targets. See S岳nat，Ses-
sion Ordinaire de 1999-2000， Rapport d'information par Henri de Richemont， Annexe au 
Proc色S句verbalde la seance du 27 juin 2000 at. p. 163. 
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4. The Erika Spill， an illustration of shortfalls and gaps. 
During the early moming of 12 December 1999 the Maltese regis-
tered tanker Erikαbroke in two in gale force winds in the Bay of 
Biscay approximately 60 miles off the Brittany Coast. At出etime of 
the incident， the tanker was c町ηing31， 000 tonnes of highly toxic 
heavy fuel oil. On 25 December， the first oil slick began to hit the 
French Atlantic coast and washed up at dozens of points simultane-
ously. About 400 km of beaches including many popular holiday re-
sorts have been pol1uted by the oil， and thousands of seabirds were 
caught in it. 
The Erikαwas one of a batch of eight sister ships built in Ja-
pan during the period 1974-1976. The tanker was a 19，666 gross 
tonnage conventional st沼elsingle hull oil tanker with segregated 
ballast tanks. Following the casualty， the information released by 
the registers and classification societies showed that four out of the 
eight ships built in the same series had suffered serious structural 
damage involving cracking or buckling of the deck. 
At the time of her sinking al of the Erikα's class and statutory 
certificates were valid. She was cla呂田edwith RINA， a ful member 
of IACS.τ'he ship was under the management of an Italian com-
pany， which was also ISM ce此i貨edby RINA.世le24 old tanker 
sailed under Maltese flag， was owned by the Savarese family of Sor-
rento in Italy through the Tevere Shipping Company of Valletta 
and was operated by Panship Management & Services of Italy. 
Between 1991 and 1999， she was inspected 16 times by port 
state control inspectors and 2 times by the flag states control in-
spectors. This figure does not include the vetting inspections under-
taken by the oiI majors， orthe surveys carried out by the classifica-
tion society. Several oil companies chartered the Erikαthroughout 
the 1990s.官leinspect刀rsof Texaco， E認 on'ssubsidiary Standard 
M町ine，RepsoI and Shell approved her as 批 to.canγtheircぽ goes.
τ'he vessel was also approved by TotalFina whose cargo it was car-
開18 
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rying when it sank. In December 1999， the Erika had the approval 
of most of major oiI companies， which carry out vetting inspections 
prior to hiring a tanker. 
Hence， by al existing standards the Erika was fit for the busi-
ness and possessed a clean bil of health delivered by a world class 
classi伍cationsociety (RINA). However， the structural failures which 
brought it down show that it was not and that there was a substan-
tial gap between theOIγ(certificates and other requirements) and 
the real condition of this ship. Among other issues， this contrast 
particularly raises questions not only on the effectiveness (or lack of 
it) of PSC measures， but most importantly on the strength and in岨
herent limits of Port State Control as a device for eradicating自ub-
standard shipping. 
Clearly， ifPort State control rules were su官icientand fully enforced 
this incident could have been prevented since the Erika has been 
subject to PSC in Novorossiysk自hortlybefore it broke in two. This 
demonstrates that inspections measures in the way they are carried 
out do not always allow inspectors to detect certain flaws.50 Studies 
have also shown a lack of consistency in inspections even in States 
parties to the same MOU let alone between States belonging to dif-
ferent MOU51. This situation has much to do with the fact that de-
spite the existence of MOU， the substance of controls varies 仕om
one State to another depending of their maritime culture or some-
times their sense of business. This lack of consistency may result in 
a diversion of traffic toward ports that have the reputation of being 
softer on visiting ships and leave considerable scope for irresponsi-
ble shipowners to avoid compliance. It is not enough to adopt and 
'" P8C under the Paris and Tokyo MOU or even the US OPA， inthe way they were car. 
ried before 1999 would not have detected the structural faults which caused the Erika 
to break up. Only the type inspecti凹ondone by Clas田si五cat“ion80cieties in dry dock could 
reveal problems of thi阻skind. 8ee Gl'ay 
t初θ Port 8t飽直t旬eControl 2000， Lloyd's List Daily Commercial News Melbourne Australia 
May 31， 200 at p.3. 
M 8ee Datta and Blor，“Port-state Control and ILO Conventions" in Seawα，ys， January 
2004 at p.2. 
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commit oneself to following common standards， itIs essential that 
there is also uniformity in interpretation and implementation. A 
possible solution to narrowing the implementation gap could be the 
creation of regional agencies within the framework of existing MOU 
under which PSCO would directly operate. In other words， imple脚
mentation should be brought under the regional realm and PSCO 
placed under the control of a unique regional body rather than hav-
ing to depend on a string of disparate maritime authorities. While 
this may sound far fetched is other MOU， itmay not be so in a 
European context where fishing for instance is already a community 
matter. 
Another problem that besets international efforts for a reliable and 
sound Port State Control is the problem of resources， in particular 
financial and human resources. Port State Control is not a big reve-
nue earner and so resources are always likely to be limited; on the 
contrary it requires the deployment of important financial assets 
and a sizeable number of highly qualified personnel who must be 
competent enough to get the job done properly. The implication is 
that it may not be affordable for poorer nations to develop sophisti-
cated and reliable Port State ControJ52 without substantial external 
? ?
?
??
assistance. Moreover， because of their dependence of foreign trade， 
developing countries may not be willing to impose tough PSC meas-
ures， should they have the means to implement them， for fear of not 
having to pay more on transport or undermining the competitive po・
臼itionof their own ports. Substandard ships continue to exist be-
cause they are the cheapest to charter. 
The problem of scarcity resources is not necessarily an issue for de-
veloping countrIes. Developed nations also face this type of problem， 
although in a different way. A patently obvious example is the case 
of France which fails to meet its 25% mandatory target under the 
Paris MOU due to a shortage of PSCO. According to one industry 
出 Ibid.at p.3 
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commentator53， the shortage of qualified personnel in France is the 
direct result of the policy of French shipowners to flag out to con刷
venient registries and the ensuing practice of hiring low paid for-
ei伊ぽew.Since the best qualified PSCO are those who have a 
maritime experience54， the shrinking of the French fleet leads旬 a
shortage of poten“al candidates to fil up the vacancies and results 
into an imbalance between demand and supply of PSCO. A French 
Senate information report'出 (hereinafterthe Richemont report)， pub-
lished after the Erika incident also shows that imposing inspection 
targets when there is a shortage of inspectors could lead to a per-
vert芯dsense of priorities. The report states that in France，加spec-
tors would rather visit five well輔maintainedvessels a day than one 
vessel that presents clear signs of substandardness because由is
could take them a day or more and require more resources. 
However， besides the problem of resources (human and economic) 
and the lack of uniformity in implementation which explains the 
∞ntre-performances of PSC， a long term solution to substandard 
shipping lies in a better understanding of the economic parameters 
which fuels the phenomenon instead of exclusively relying on com-
mand and control legislation. Substandard shipping; it is suggested 
is an unwanted externality of the way the international shipping 
market operates today. Therefore any solution to it must look at the 
economic factors that brought the problem to existence in the first 
place and explain its persistence. 
When one looks at the actual conditions of maritime trade， two ele-
ments become rather conspicuous. First the imbalance in the global 
tanker market between the supply of ships and the demand from 
cargo owners resulting from the global economic slowdown， inother 
?
?
?
間 Berlet"Un Pavilon Francais pour defendre nos 凶tes}給 inLe8 Echo8 of May 17th， 
200. 
嗣 Gray“'Port State Control， Where to Now?" Presentation to Port State Control 2000， 
Lloyd's List Daily Commercial News Melbourne Australia May 31， 200 at p.5 
描 Senat，Sesion Ordinaire de 1999輔2000，Rapport d'information par. Henri de 
Richemont， Annexe au Proc色s-verbalde la seance du 27 juin 200. at. p. 163. 
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words， a discrepancy between supply and demand which drives 
down fare rates to dangerously low levels56. Today this gap is such 
that some shipowners have difficulties paying the salaries of their 
employees. Under such circumstances， security becomes a luxury 
and cost cutting the first priority. The persistence of this situation 
increases the pressure on shipowners and operators to achieve sav・
ings no matter the consequences， either by flagging out to conven-
ience registriesペorby pushing for the establishment of so called 
“second registries" .58 The result is that in 2000， 11 FOCS totalize弘
of alllosses at sea in terms ofworld tonnage.59 
Moreover， when profitability margins are low as it is the case today， 
it becomes highly unlikely that shipowners would invest in new 
ships.60 An unintended consequence of this rational attitude is that 
older ships will remain in business."l Since such ships may not be 
allowed to freely operate in rich countries where flag requirements 
are tougher and Port State Control increasingly more severely im-
plemented， these ships will migrate to convenient registries where 
the fear of legal retribution is almost inexistent， and trade between 
ports where the risk of being caught is the lowest62 either because 
?
?
???
四 Seethe BRS Report 2000 at p. 35. 
57 Bouvais，“Les pavillons de complaisance en Iigne de mire" in Novethic， Issue of No-
vember 27，2001. 
" Also called “Bis registries"， they represent a reaction of traditional maritime nations 
to the fast reduction of their local merchant flet due to the competition of flags of con-
venience. The日rstexample of this brand of hybrid registries was established by Nor-
way in 1987， the Norwegian International Ship Register and was soon folIowed by other 
European countries. France (Kergueken)， Italy， Portugal (Madeira)， Belgium， Great 
Britain (Man Islands). The “Bis registries" ofer more flexibility since they allow for the 
recruitment of multinational crew and negotiate salaries without reference to European 
standards. However， even this would not be enough to counter the iresistible rise of 
flags of convenience. 
59 Bouvais， not泡 56
曲 Anew VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) costs today 80 millions USD. To make such 
出 1investment profitable in a reasonable period of time， an owner must make 30.000 a 
day in returns. Between 1998 and 1999， the maximum return per day has dropped from 
30.675 USD to 19.000 USD， a 38% decrease in just one year! It follows that the only 
profitable ships are the ones that have already been redeemed， that is to say the oldest 
ships. See Valois Le tr，αnsport de petrole pαr mer， Celse (1999) at p. 109. 
61 More than 579もofthe world's tanker f1eet is more that 25 years old， see Richemont 
Report at p. 141. 
62 Scorpecci，“Economic advantages of non -compliance with Pollution Regulations" Nat-
ship 2004 Conference， Melbourne 19 -20 February， 2004 at pp.7 -8 
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such States value the business more than the environment or sim-
ply because they cannot afford the technology or do not have the 
necessary human expe此iseto enforce in胎mationalsafety standards. 
It is therefore the conditions in the market that explain a great deal 
why substandard shipping has proven di伍cultto eradicate despite 
the wealth of laws existing at the intemational， regional and na-
tional level aimed at addressing it. The problem of substandard 
shipping has deeply rooted economic causes; however the solutions 
that have been sought to address it have been mostly political.often 
aimed at placating public outraged by a recu町enceof catastrophic 
tanker accident. A more realistic approach would be to address the 
causes of the problem rather than seeking to tackle is unwanted 
manifestations. 
Conclusion and suggestions 
The pre自entstudy has shown that while there is worldwide consen圃
sus that PSC plays an important role in cracking down substandard 
shipping， itmay not offer the best warranty for eradicating the 
problem. Port State Control certainly has a role to play and there is 
evidence to suggest that it is making some impact.63 However it c創 1
only serve its purpose when the international community under-
stands its limits and therefore the ext怠ntto which it needs to be 
supplemented by other approaches. Exclusive reliance on PSC 
would not stamp out substandard shipping. Due to the unequal dis-
tribution of resources and the nature of incentives; it will only lead 
to a migration of substandard ships towards ports where controls 
are less stringent either by design or simply by the lack of means. 
四 τ'heintemational community must consider economic measures 
~ which seek to address the root側側 ofsubstandard shipping 
( 
22 
)曲SeeDatta and Bloor， article quoted at note 51. 
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rather than just trying to address its unwanted effects同Itis sug-
gested that such measures could take the form of an international 
buy out of older tankers in order to reduce the number of ships 
available. This would make the transport business become profit-
able and send a positive signal to potential investors. The key ob-
stacle to the renewal of the world's tanker fleet has been the profit-
ability issue. Measures aimed at accelerating the retirement of 
older tankers would help alleviate this problem. Alternatively， 
States could adopt various internal measures such as tax reliefs， 
subsidies or other positive incentives in order to encourage the pur-
chase of new vessels. This would reduce the risks for potential in幽
vestors by improving the prospect for competing with FOCs as well 
as discourage the practice itself. When substandard shipping is no 
longer profitable， owners of such ships will voluntarily take to the 
demolition yard as this would be the only reasonable option left for 
?。???
them. 
